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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE POST-WAR ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF THE COUNTRY: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE

The article examines the role of international economic activity in the recovery of countries after large-scale destruction using the examples of Great Britain, South Korea, Poland and Israel. The key instruments of foreign economic policy are analyzed, in particular trade liberalization, export stimulation and attraction of foreign direct investment. Particular attention is paid to the mechanisms of integration of affected economies into global markets: from the Marshall Plan and financial openness of Great Britain to export-oriented industrialization of South Korea and technology transfer in Israel. The article provides a comparative analysis of these models and formulates recommendations for Ukraine, emphasizing the need to deepen European integration, develop technological exports and create a favorable climate for foreign capital.

Keywords: post-war recovery, international economic activity, foreign direct investment, export-led development, trade liberalization, European integration, Marshall Plan, technology transfer, external markets, experience for Ukraine.

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МІЖНАРОДНА ЕКОНОМІЧНА ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ У ПІСЛЯВОЄННОМУ ЕКОНОМІЧНОМУ ВІДНОВЛЕННІ КРАЇНИ: МІЖНАРОДНИЙ ДОСВІД

У контексті євроінтеграційного курсу України економічна декарбонізація набуває ключового значення як складова сучасної екологічної політики та інструмент державного регулювання, спрямований на досягнення кліматичної нейтральності й сталого розвитку. Актуальність дослідження зумовлена необхідністю післявоєнного відновлення економіки, яке має поєднувати відбудову виробничого потенціалу з його структурною модернізацією та зменшенням негативного впливу на довкілля. В умовах триваючих воєнних дій, фінансово-економічної нестабільності, політичної невизначеності та загострення екологічної кризи формування ефективної державної політики декарбонізації стає стратегічним завданням для України.

У статті проаналізовано наукові праці вітчизняних і зарубіжних дослідників щодо сутності економічної декарбонізації як інструменту протидії зміні клімату, визначено її основні економічні, екологічні та соціальні переваги, а також бар'єри впровадження. Особливу увагу приділено ринковим і регуляторним механізмам формування низьковуглецевої економіки, зокрема фіскальним інструментам, податковим стимулам, механізмам ціноутворення на викиди та підтримці «зелених» інновацій. Виявлено недостатню розробленість управлінських аспектів декарбонізації економіки України, особливо з урахуванням воєнного стану та необхідності гармонізації екологічної політики з вимогами Європейського Союзу.

Метою статті є обґрунтування пріоритетних заходів економічної декарбонізації та визначення напрямів удосконалення екологічної політики України в системі державного регулювання природоохоронної діяльності з урахуванням технологічних інновацій і кращих зарубіжних практик. У дослідженні систематизовано інструменти реалізації державної політики декарбонізації, проведено SWAN-аналіз для комплексної оцінки її стану та PEST-аналіз для ідентифікації зовнішніх політичних, економічних, інвестиційних та інноваційних чинників впливу. Запропоновано запровадження податку на викиди CO_2 у складі загального акцизу на паливо як джерела наповнення Фонду декарбонізації України та створення системи моніторингу викидів CO_2 автотранспортом з метою підвищення обґрунтованості управлінських рішень.

Ключові слова: післявоєнне відновлення, міжнародна економічна діяльність, прямі іноземні інвестиції, експортоорієнтований розвиток, лібералізація торгівлі, євроінтеграція, план Маршалла, трансфер технологій, зовнішні ринки, досвід для України.

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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM IN GENERAL AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH IMPORTANT SCIENTIFIC OR PRACTICAL TASKS

The full-scale aggression caused critical destruction to Ukraine, which requires a systemic approach to recovery. This process should not be just a recreation of the pre-war state, but a deep transformation of the economy

and integration into the EU. International economic activity plays a key role here as a channel for attracting resources and technologies. The lack of a scientifically sound strategy creates risks of ineffective use of aid and preservation of the raw material model. Therefore, it is critically important to analyze the experience of countries that have successfully overcome the consequences of the war: South Korea (export orientation), Great Britain (social stabilization), Israel (innovation) and Poland (market transformation). Adaptation of these models is a prerequisite for the formation of an effective recovery strategy for Ukraine.

ANALYSIS OF LATEST RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS

The issue of post-war economic recovery is in the focus of attention of both international institutions and the scientific community, which is due to its interdisciplinary nature and significant practical significance. Basic approaches to post-war reconstruction of economies, in particular mechanisms for attracting external financial assistance, implementing institutional reforms and coordinating international economic activity, are thoroughly covered in reports by the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

A significant body of scientific research is devoted to the analysis of national models of post-war development and the features of the use of instruments of international economic interaction. Thus, the phenomenon of accelerated industrialization of South Korea and the role of state dirigisme in stimulating exports are disclosed in detail in the works of A. Amelin *[1]* and other researchers, who focus on the support of large corporate structures ("chaebols") and targeted export policy. The restoration of the economy of Great Britain after World War II is considered through the prism of the implementation of the "Marshall Plan", the formation of a model of a social state based on Keynesian economic theory and further structural changes during the period of liberal reforms.

A separate group of studies consists of works devoted to countries whose development took place under conditions of prolonged external threats or deep systemic transformations. In particular, the formation of Israel's innovative economy, based on close interaction between the state, the defense sector, and private business, is covered in detail in GIS reports. Reports [2] and Global Israeli Initiative [3]. At the same time, Poland's experience related to the implementation of the "shock therapy" policy, the functioning of special economic zones [4] and the impact of European integration processes on the structure of the national economy [5] has been comprehensively analyzed in studies by the National Bank of Poland, the European Commission and experts from the Ukrainian Institute for the Future (UIF) [6].

HIGHLIGHTING THE PREVIOUSLY UNSOLVED PARTS OF THE GENERAL PROBLEM TO WHICH THE SPECIFIC ARTICLE IS DEDICATED

Despite the significant body of scientific research devoted to the post-war economic recovery of individual states, the scientific literature still does not sufficiently present generalizing comparative approaches that would allow for a systematic comparison of different models of reconstruction from the standpoint of international economic activity. Most of the existing works focus on the analysis of individual national cases, which makes it difficult to form a holistic picture of the common and distinctive features of the use of foreign economic instruments in the recovery process. At the same time, such critically important parameters as the degree of state intervention in foreign economic processes, the structure and sources of attracting external financing, as well as the socio-economic consequences of implementing relevant reforms, are often left out of due attention.

Special attention is required to the problem of practical adaptation of the accumulated international experience to the specific conditions of modern Ukraine. The uniqueness of the Ukrainian case is determined by the combination of a long military confrontation, large-scale losses of economic potential and the simultaneous implementation of a course for full-scale integration into the European Union. In this context, the issue of forming an effective model of international economic activity in the post-war period, capable of ensuring not only the rapid restoration of production capacities, but also the long-term structural modernization of the economy in accordance with European development standards, remains insufficiently studied.

Thus, the existing scientific gap necessitates a comprehensive comparative analysis of the international experience of post-war reconstruction in order to identify tools and mechanisms of international economic activity suitable for adaptation to the modern socio-economic realities of Ukraine.

FORMULATION OF ARTICLE OBJECTIVES

The purpose of the article is to conduct a comprehensive comparative analysis of the international experience of post-war economic recovery with an emphasis on the role of forms and instruments of regulation of international economic activity in Great Britain, South Korea, Israel, and Poland, as well as to substantiate the possibilities of adapting the most effective practices to the conditions of post-war economic development of Ukraine.

PRESENTATION OF THE MAIN RESEARCH MATERIAL WITH FULL JUSTIFICATION OF THE OBTAINED SCIENTIFIC RESULTS

Ukraine's post-war recovery should be seen as a large-scale structural modernization, encompassing infrastructure, technology, and institutional renewal. The goal is not to return to the past, but to build a competitive

economy of the European model. In this context, it is appropriate to analyze the tools of countries that used the post-war crisis as a springboard for growth.

South Korea's experience is a textbook example of the transition from postwar ruin to global leadership through export-led industrialization. The Park Chung-hee government adopted a comprehensive approach: devaluation and unification of the national currency (the South Korean won); creation of the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA (1962)) to promote exports; and provision of tax holidays and preferential loans to exporters. This ensured an average annual growth of exports of 35.3% in the 1960s *[7]*. To maintain competitiveness, the state combined incentives with strict protectionism, limiting imports of consumer goods and directing resources to the development of large industrial conglomerates *(Table 1)*.

Table 1

Five-year economic development plans for South Korea

Period	Main tasks and development directions
1962–1966	Formation of the basic industrial structure, (up to 77% of the price) import tariffs, import substitution policy
1967–1971	Development of steel, engineering and chemical industries. Import tariffs were reduced, while businesses that met established export quotas were given access to subsidized loans and other benefits.
1972–1976	Industrialization of heavy and chemical industries; formation of an export-oriented economic structure
1977–1981	Increased competitiveness in world markets; development of mechanical engineering, electronics and shipbuilding. Old debts of companies to the unregulated financial market were replaced by debt with a single rate (1.35% per month), which had to be repaid 5 years after the initial three-year grace period. Short-term debts to the banking system were replaced by a unified debt (8% per annum, 3 years grace period, 5 years of repayment). Real interest rates were practically zero or negative - annual inflation in 1971-1974 was 13.5%, 11.7%, 3.2% and 24.3%, respectively.
1982–1986	Shifting emphasis to high-tech industries: precision engineering, electronics
1987–1991	High-tech priority: microelectronics, bioengineering, optics, aerospace industry
1992–1996	Continuing the course on innovation, gradual liberalization of imports and integration into the global economy

Source: compiled by the author based on data [1].

During the 1950s, South Korea's economic structure was characterized by the dominance of the agricultural sector, which accounted for about half of the country's gross domestic product. The share of industrial production during this period did not exceed 20%, while the service sector provided about a third of economic activity. However, by the early 1990s, the country had undergone profound structural changes: the share of agriculture in GDP had decreased to about 8%, while the share of industry had increased to 45%, and the service sector to 47%. Over four decades, South Korea had made a transformational transition from a predominantly agrarian, war-torn economy to a highly developed industrial state with a diversified production structure and a developed service sector.

The dynamics of South Korea's gross domestic product in 1950–2024 clearly reflects the trajectory of the country's post-war economic growth *(Fig . 1)* . The first post-war decades were characterized by relatively low growth rates and limited economic opportunities, which was a consequence of significant war destruction. At the same time, it was in the 1950s and 1960s that the institutional and production foundations of future industrialization were laid, in particular through the implementation of the import substitution policy, the active use of international economic instruments, and the attraction of foreign financial assistance, primarily from the United States and Japan. In the future, these factors became catalysts for accelerated economic development and integration of South Korea into the world economy.



Fig. 1. Dynamics of South Korea's GDP volume in 1950 - 2024, billion dollars

Source: constructed by the author based on [1].

At the initial stage of South Korea's post-war economic development, state policy in the field of international investment activity was characterized by a cautious and selective approach. The government purposefully limited the inflow of foreign direct investment, giving preference to alternative channels for attracting external resources, in

particular, licensing advanced technologies, importing production equipment and using external credit resources. This strategy allowed to ensure technological renewal of national industry without losing control over key sectors of the economy.

Since the 1990s, and especially after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the country's investment policy has undergone significant changes in the direction of liberalization. Most administrative and regulatory restrictions on foreign investors have been gradually lifted, as a result of which South Korea has transformed from one of the most closed economies in the region to one of the most open in Asia. Today, the country has accumulated more than $133 billion in foreign direct investment, which plays an important role in financing high-tech and knowledge-intensive industries *[7]*.

Thanks to increased investment openness, South Korea was able to intensify the attraction of capital and technological know-how from key international partners, in particular the United States, the European Union countries, and Japan, which contributed to the deepening of its integration into global value chains and the strengthening of its position in the world economy *(Table 2)*.

Table 2

South Korea's tools on the path to economic growth

No.	Direction / tool	Content / actions	Consequences / features
1	Import substitution policy	Immediately after the war, high import tariffs (up to 77%) were introduced to achieve economic self-sufficiency.	The expected results were not fully realized.
2	Support for big business – "chaebols"	Financial support, loans, benefits, subsidies; difficult entry of new players; cooperation with the government in priority areas	The development of global giants (LG, Samsung, Hyundai); at the same time, monopolization, corruption, restrictions on small and medium-sized businesses
3	Export orientation and five-year plans	State control of the economy, export regulation, setting quotas, determining priority industries	The invariance of the course of reforms in 1961–1979 under the conditions of a dictatorial regime
4	Education	After the war, the education system was actively developed; the main resource was the population; the culture and worldview of Koreans contributed to the mobilization of society	Training highly qualified specialists capable of supporting technological progress
5	Scientific developments and innovations	70s – consulting center for attracting foreign technologies; mandatory exchange of technologies between companies; 90s – science centers, technology parks, incubators, startups	Implementation of innovative development programs ("On the Edge of the 21st Century", "Intelligent Korea", "Giga Korea", "All-Listening Korea", etc.); R&D spending – about 5% of GDP

Source: constructed by the author based on data [7].

International innovation cooperation is an important factor. To support technological breakthroughs, the South Korean government concludes bilateral scientific agreements with foreign partners, stimulates the participation of Korean specialists in joint R&D projects, and creates international startup initiatives. This policy promotes the transfer of advanced knowledge and the combination of Korean developments with global trends. The result has been rapid technological development: today, the products of Samsung, LG, and other Korean leaders are part of global production chains (for example, South Korean semiconductors account for over 20% of global production), and the country itself is known as an attractive platform for high-tech investments and partnerships. In addition, Korea has concluded more than twenty free trade agreements with major economic blocs (including the EU, the USA, RCEP), which has opened up global markets for it and facilitated an active exchange of innovations.

Many researchers see a number of commonalities between South Korea and Ukraine, noting that Ukraine could benefit from the experience of the "Korean economic miracle" in its development.

However, post-war Korea was rebuilt rather slowly from the standpoint of human life expectancy, and to a greater extent thanks to financial support from the USA, and later Japan. In the future, the Korean experience of implementing a creative economy and technological progress may be useful for Ukraine, so it would be relevant to study government programs for the development of innovations. Not the least place is also occupied by Korea's increased attention to the development of the education system and the formation of high-quality human resources within the country.

Great Britain after World War II focused on restoring exports ("Export or Die") and the development of a welfare state. Despite the critical state of the economy, the government stabilized the situation through austerity, trade liberalization *(Fig. 2)* and assistance under the "Marshall Plan" (~3.3 billion dollars), which was aimed mainly at servicing external debt and importing raw materials. By the mid-1950s, the economy had entered a trajectory of stable growth, remaining committed to the principles of free trade within the framework of the Bretton Woods system .



Fig. 2. Annual growth rates of GDP per capita in Great Britain in 1940–1955, %.
Source: created by the author based on data [8].

During the war years (1940–1943), there was a high level of economic activity due to tight state control over the economy and the mobilization of resources - annual growth rates exceeded 6–10%. However, with the end of the war, the country faced a deep recession: in 1944–1948, the indicators became negative, reaching a minimum in 1946 (–8%). Starting from 1949, the economy gradually stabilized. Although individual years were still characterized by a decline, in the first half of the 1950s, Great Britain managed to enter a stable recovery trajectory, and by 1955, annual growth rates returned to a positive level (2–3%). The set of measures that ensured this stabilization is summarized in (Table 3).

Table 3

Measures for the post-war recovery of the UK economy

Direction	Specific measures
Financial policy	Conclusion of a credit agreement with the USA ($3.75 billion) and Canada ($1.19 billion); raising funds under the Marshall Plan; devaluation of the pound (1949)
Social policy	Implementation of the ideas of the "welfare state" according to the Beveridge report; introduction of national insurance; creation of the National Health Service (NHS); assistance for families and the unemployed
Housing policy	Homes for All (building over 1.2 million homes); New Towns Act; Greater London Plan; relocation of residents to new areas
Industry and infrastructure	Nationalization of railways, coal mines, Bank of England, electricity; modernization of strategic industries; investment in manufacturing
Education	Education Act of 1944: raising the school-leaving age to 15; free secondary education; access through a system of tests, not by parental means
International politics	Active participation in the creation of the Bretton Woods system, the IMF, NATO; beginning of decolonization (India, Palestine, Burma, Ceylon)

Source: compiled by the author based on data [9].

The most significant changes occurred in the 1980s under Margaret Thatcher. The government sharply reduced state intervention in the economy, betting on privatization and deregulation . In 1986, the "Big Bang" reform of the London Stock Exchange took place, which allowed foreign financial companies to open branches in London. Currency restrictions were abolished, giving the British freedom in international currency transactions. As a result, London became the world's largest center for currency trading: daily transaction volumes increased from $25 billion in 1979 to $184 billion in 1989, and London had 37% of the global forex market (more than twice as much as New York). At the same time, the government created enterprise zones with tax breaks - for example, in the London Docklands, which contributed to the influx of foreign investment into regions that were previously depressed.

The UK has traditionally invested significant resources in science, technology and education. Now, through the UK Research and Innovation agency and the Science and Innovation Network, the government is expanding international ties: encouraging joint research projects with partners from the US, Canada, the EU and other countries.

An important step was the official accession to the Horizon Europe program (2023), which guarantees British scientists participation in European research grants. Such initiatives contribute to the exchange of knowledge and the

joint development of high-tech products. In addition, the UK has a strong system of universities and start-up centers that actively cooperate with international laboratories, strengthening intercultural scientific exchange.

The United Kingdom remains one of the world's leading economies today. It ranks 6th in the world in terms of gross domestic product and 8th in terms of purchasing power parity. The country ranks 25th in terms of GDP per capita, reflecting a balanced, but not the highest, level of well-being among developed countries. According to OECD data, GDP growth was expected to be 3.6% in 2022, but at the same time the country faced serious challenges: inflation reached almost 10%, which was caused by a labor shortage and a sharp increase in energy prices. The United Kingdom shows consistently high results in terms of the Human Development Index *[8]* .

These reforms have made Britain attractive to capital inflows from around the world. According to data for 2023, London ranks first among global financial centers in terms of the number of projects with foreign investment in the financial services sector. The majority of such investments come from the United States (about 40% over the past five years) and Europe, reflecting a strong transatlantic connection *[8]* . There is particularly high activity in the field of fintech and technology: more than a quarter of FDI projects in the financial sector were related to innovation (fintech platforms, artificial intelligence startups, etc.).

Unlike many other countries, the United Kingdom did not create a special body to coordinate the post-war recovery processes. However, thanks to the consistent implementation of well-thought-out policies and reforms, the state has achieved significant results in post-war reconstruction. This is, first of all, about the reform of the judicial and law enforcement systems, civil service, privatization processes and the education sector. It is no less important to complete the transformation of the healthcare system, while paying attention to the issues of social insurance of citizens. A separate challenge will be planning the reconstruction of damaged cities and villages and designing new settlements. In these conditions, prioritizing reforms and their consistent implementation becomes of paramount importance.

While the experience of Great Britain demonstrates a model of socially-oriented recovery within an established democracy, Israel offers a completely different, unique example – building an innovative economy in the face of a permanent military threat. Faced with existential challenges since independence, the country has transformed a defense imperative into a powerful engine of economic growth.

One of the clearest indicators of the success of this model is the dynamics of arms exports. In recent years, Israel has demonstrated rapid growth in sales, breaking records for the third year in a row. In 2023, the volume of defense exports reached $13 billion *[10]* It is important to note that, against the backdrop of a full-scale war, Ukraine is also rapidly developing its own defense-industrial complex, which not only provides a significant part of the front's needs, but also creates technologies with export potential in the future.

This indicator is the result of a long-term strategy, where the defense-industrial complex (DIC) acts not only as a guarantor of security, but also as a key supplier of high-tech products to the global market *(Fig. 3)* .



Fig . 3. Arms export volumes in Israel in 2010-2023, million dollars

Source: constructed by the author based on [10].

The foundation of this success is unprecedented investment in research and development (R&D). Israel ranks first in the world in terms of R&D spending as a share of GDP (6.3%), well ahead of South Korea (5.0%) and the United States (3.4%), and is twice as high as the average for OECD countries (2.7%) *(Fig. 4).*



Fig . 4. Share of gross domestic expenditure on research and development in the GDP of the world's countries in 2023, %.
Source: compiled by the author based on data [2].

The structure of these investments in Israel is fundamentally important : the vast majority (93%) of them fall into the business sector *(Fig. 5)*.



Fig . 5. Structure of research and development expenditures in Israel in 2023
Source: constructed by the author based on Statista data [11].

The role of the state, as played by the Israel Innovation Authority (Israel Innovation Authority), is not about direct control, but about a "smart investor" strategy. The government acts as a catalyst, purposefully reducing financial risks for private companies.

This is implemented through co-financing programs for risky research projects at early stages. If the project achieves commercial success, the company returns the state investment; in case of failure, the state takes the losses. This approach encourages businesses to undertake breakthrough but risky developments, knowing that there is a state "safety cushion" *[2]*.

Despite its remarkable successes, Israel's innovation ecosystem faces new challenges. Analysts say the future of the technology sector will depend on its ability to adapt to global changes and maintain its unique advantage. A key element of Israel's "secret sauce" is not only technology, but also a special mentality: a willingness to take risks, a culture of "chutzpah" (creative daring), and experience gained in high-tech units of the army, which stimulates informal connections and the rapid exchange of ideas. However, overreliance on global venture capital and the potential for a "brain drain" remain serious risks. Therefore, the path ahead requires not only further investment, but also efforts to strengthen ties between academia, industry, and global markets *[2]*.

For Ukraine, the Israeli experience is not just a theoretical example, but also the basis for a strategic partnership that is already actively developing. Over the past six years, cooperation in the technological sphere has attracted more than $150 million in investments *[3]*. More than 300 Israeli companies have opened their offices in Ukraine, and more than 50 Ukrainian companies have found partners and clients in Israel.

The potential for deepening this partnership is enormous, especially in the areas of dual-use technologies such as unmanned systems, electronic warfare (EW), and cybersecurity. The combination of Israeli innovative solutions and Ukrainian engineering talent, hardened in real combat conditions, can create a unique synergy that will strengthen the defense capabilities of both countries and open up new opportunities in the global market *[3]*.

If the experience of Israel demonstrates the effectiveness of building a sustainable "innovation fortress", then for Ukraine, which has chosen the path of integration into the European Union, the experience of systemic market transformation is of particular value. One of the most striking examples of such a model is Poland, which successfully transitioned from a planned economy to a dynamic market system.

Poland began its transformation in 1989 in the midst of a deep crisis and hyperinflation (585 %) (*Fig. 6*). The basis of recovery was “shock therapy” (Balcerowicz Plan), which combined strict macroeconomic stabilization, price liberalization, and opening the economy to international trade. This allowed the deficit to be eliminated and a market environment to be created.



Fig . 6. Inflation rate in Poland during the reforms in 1987-1997, %

Source: Statista and Tiger [12; pp. 2, 13].

The reforms resulted in significant economic growth for the country. In 1990, Poland’s nominal GDP was only $65.98 billion *(Figure 7)*. During the difficult period of transformation, the economy gradually entered a stable development trajectory, and after joining the European Union in 2004, growth accelerated significantly — GDP reached $255.11 billion. By 2022, Poland’s nominal GDP had increased more than tenfold, reaching $688.13 billion, which confirms the effectiveness of the chosen model of market reforms and integration into the European economic space.



Fig . 7. Dynamics of Poland's GDP in 1990-2022, billion dollars.

Source: compiled by the author based on data from [5;14].

An important tool for attracting capital was the 14 Special Economic Zones (SEZs), established in 1994. Thanks to tax incentives, they attracted significant foreign investment, with Germany (17.7%), the United States (12.3%), and the Netherlands (11.5%) being the key donors. This contributed to the creation of new jobs, although it also exacerbated disparities between regions. *(Table 4) [4]* .

Table 4

Top 5 foreign investors in Special Economic Zones of Poland

Country of origin	Amount , million PLN	Share in total capital , %
Germany	18 043.9	17.70%
USA	12 545.6	12.31%
Netherlands	11 742.4	11.52%
Japan	7 024.7	6.89%
Italy	6 963.9	6.83%

Source: constructed by the author based on JMFS data [4].

The key strategic driver of Poland's transformation has been European integration. The prospect, and later accession to the European Union in 2004, provided a powerful incentive for deep structural reforms. The EU accession process acted as an external "anchor" that disciplined the country's economic policy, and integration into the single market opened up a huge market for Polish exporters. In addition, Poland has effectively absorbed billions of euros from the EU's Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund, channelling them into infrastructure development *(Figure 8).*



Fig . 8. Poland's contributions to the EU budget and revenues from it in 2004 - 2022.

Source: Notes from Poland [5].

Despite impressive successes, the Polish economic model has faced new challenges. After decades of rapid growth, the country has come close to falling into the “middle-income trap”—a situation where the economy loses its competitiveness based on cheap labor but is not yet able to compete in the innovation market. The demographic crisis and dependence on foreign capital have become critical problems, which is an important lesson for Ukraine *[6]*.

A generalized comparative analysis of the considered models is given in *(Table 5).*

Table 5

Comparative analysis of post-war recovery models of countries

Criterion	South Korea	Great Britain	Israel	Poland
The role of the state	Conductor (five-year plans, chaebols)	Social guarantor (welfare state)	Catalyst for innovation	Liberal reformer
Source of capital	Foreign aid (USA), exports	Marshall Plan, loans	Venture capital, defense industry exports	Foreign direct investment, EU funds
Key driver	Industrialization	Social reforms	Technology and security	Integration into the EU
Social price	High (dictatorship, inequality)	Low (social guarantees)	Medium (militarization)	High (shock therapy)

Source: constructed by the author.

To assess the effectiveness of the considered models of international economic activity and understand the gap caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war, it is advisable to compare the key macroeconomic indicators of the United Kingdom, South Korea, Israel, and Poland with current data for Ukraine (*Table 6*).

Table 6

Key indicators of economic development of the United Kingdom, South Korea, Israel, Poland and Ukraine in 2024

Indicator	Great Britain	South Korea	Israel	Poland	Ukraine
GDP, billion dollars	3 686	1 875	540	917	190
GDP per capita, USD/person	53 246	36 238	54 176	25 103	6 031
Inflation, %, year-on-year	3.3	2.3	3.1	3.8	6.9
Unemployment, % of working age population	4.1	2.6	3.1	2.5	9
Foreign direct investment , % of GDP	-1.6	0.8	2.7	2.2	1.7
Exports, % of GDP	31.0	44.4	28.4	52.2	21.9
External public debt, % of GDP	101.29	52.5	67.85	55.28	72.3
Trade balance, billion dollars	-32.14	76.4	13.06	36.7	-29
Population, million people	69.2	51.7	9.9	36.6	31.5
Migration balance, persons	417 114	75 963	10 612	-238 062	-443 000

Source: constructed by the authors based on data [15-24].

The comparative analysis of macroeconomic indicators visualizes a significant economic gap between countries. The volume of GDP per capita in Ukraine (*6 031 USD*), although demonstrating nominal growth, still remains low: it is 4 times lower than that of Poland (*25 103 USD*) and almost 9 times lower than that of Israel (*54 176 USD*) and the United Kingdom (*53 246 USD*). This indicates that systemic changes in the economic model will be required to achieve the level of developed countries.

Of particular concern is the state of foreign economic activity. While Poland and South Korea demonstrate a stable positive trade balance (*36.7 billion USD and 76.4 billion USD, respectively*) and a high share of exports in GDP (*from 44.4% to 52.2%*), Ukraine has a trade deficit *(-29 billion USD*) with a share of exports in GDP at *21.9%.* This situation is critical for the economy of a warring country and indicates the need to restore the country's export potential.

At the same time, the dynamics of demographic processes are indicative. Statistics record a difficult situation: Ukraine's migration balance remains negative and amounts to -443 000 *people* . The population in the controlled territory is estimated at *31.5 million people* , which significantly changes the structure of the country's labor potential.

Foreign direct investment in Ukraine is *1.7%* of GDP, which is the lowest among the countries studied (*Poland — 2.2%, Israel — 2.7%*). The unemployment rate in Ukraine (*~9%*) remains high and is more than 3 times higher than in Poland. The share of external public debt in GDP was *72.3%,* which, in conditions of limited domestic resources, requires a balanced financial policy.

RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS

The conducted study of the international experience of post-war economic recovery in Great Britain, South Korea, Israel and Poland confirms that effective reconstruction of the national economy is not reduced to the mechanical reproduction of the pre-war structure of the economy, but involves a purposeful structural transformation with the active use of instruments of international economic activity. Despite the differences in historical and institutional conditions, a common feature of successful recovery models is the strategic role of the state in shaping development priorities, coordinating foreign economic flows and creating institutional prerequisites for attracting financial, technological and human resources from outside.

The experience of South Korea demonstrates the effectiveness of centralized strategic planning of international economic activity, focused on export-industrial development, selective support of priority industries, and active integration into global production chains. For Ukraine, this highlights the need to form an institutionally capable system for coordinating post-war recovery, capable of combining industrial, investment, and foreign economic policy instruments within a single long-term strategy.

The practice of Great Britain demonstrates that external financial assistance is effective only if it is integrated into national mechanisms of economic regulation and combined with internal reforms. In this context, the creation of transparent and accountable institutions for the management of international financial resources is of fundamental importance for Ukraine, which will minimize the risks of fragmented use of assistance and ensure its targeting for infrastructure modernization, human capital development, and increased economic productivity.

The Israeli experience confirms the decisive role of international economic activity as a channel for the transfer of technology, knowledge and innovation, and not just a source of financing. For Ukraine, this means the feasibility of institutionally stimulating innovation activity, particularly in the high-tech and defense-industrial sectors, through a combination of state support for R&D, international scientific and technological partnerships and integration into global innovation ecosystems.

The experience of Poland convincingly demonstrates the key role of harmonizing the regulatory environment with European standards in the process of structural transformation and integration into the EU internal market. For Ukraine, this emphasizes the need for accelerated adaptation of legislation in the field of international economic activity to the *EU acquis*, which should be accompanied by increasing the institutional capacity of public administration bodies and harmonizing economic, budgetary and anti-corruption policies.

Summarizing the results of the study, it can be argued that the post-war economic recovery of Ukraine should be considered as a strategic window of opportunity for the formation of a new development model based on effective regulation of international economic activity, innovation orientation and deep integration into the European and global economic space. The most promising seems to be the adaptive synthesis of the Korean model of strategic planning, the British experience in using international aid, the Israeli innovation trajectory and the Polish model of European integration, which creates the basis for sustainable long-term development of the Ukrainian economy in the post-war period.

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